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University of London, London, UK 
Abstract: The role played by environmental activists in the events leading to the 
collapse of communist rule in Czechoslovakia has been well documented. With the 
old order swept aside and a liberal democratic constitutional framework rapidly es-
tablished, it might be assumed that the environmental movement would have pro-
gressed painlessly from clandestine opposition to political prominence. However, 
for the nascent environmental movement, the post-communist decade has not seen a 
linear progression towards greater access and political efficacy. Though certain Pra-
gue-based organisations are currently enjoying a degree of relative influence within 
a renewed policy process, the movement was politically isolated and starved of re-
sources throughout the Klaus period, thereby delaying their development. It is only 
now, more than a decade since the onset of democratic reform that environmental 
organisations are beginning to resemble their western counterparts. Even so, the re-
source issue remains a critical constraint and is tied to more fundamental problems 
relating to the development of civil society which directly impact upon the environ-
mental movement at a time when critical decisions are being taken regarding nuclear 
energy and transport policy. 
Czech Sociological Review, 2000 Vol. 8 (No. 2: 139-156) 
Introduction 
Environmental protest in the Czech Republic1 has changed quite considerably over the 
past decade.2 In terms of the political influence and capacity of environmental NGOs, 
there has not been a linear progression towards increased efficacy and pluralisation. 
Rather, it is possible to discern three distinct stages: an initial phase of political promi-
nence and apparent radicalism (1990 – mid-1991); a period of political marginalisation 
and de-radicalisation (mid-1991 – 1996); and the current phase (1996 onwards) in which 
a cluster of large professional environmental NGOs have regained a degree of influence 
within a more open and consensual political opportunity structure. In trying to explain 
such variation in the nature and efficacy of environmental protest in the Czech Republic, 
a number of determinants can be identified. The political opportunity structure in which 
                                                     
*) Paper presented for the Workshop on “Environmental Protest in Comparative Perspective” at the 
27th Joint Sessions of ECPR Workshops in Mannheim, 26-31 March, 1999. 
**) Direct all correspondence to: Dr Adam Fagin, Department of Politics, Queen Mary and West-
field College, University of London, Mile End Road, London, E1 4NS, UK. 
1) ‘The Czech Republic’ is used to cover the period after 1993, though the information up until the 
demise of the federation obviously relates to Czechoslovakia as a whole. 
2) I would like to acknowledge the help of Hana Pernicová, formally Executive Director of Green-
peace ČR, who has during lengthy interviews provided me with information and data on develop-
ment in the environmental NGO sector over the past five years. I would also like to acknowledge 
the particular help of Dan Vondrouš (Duha), Jindřich Petrlík (Děti Země), Prof. Bedřich Moldan 
(ČSOP), Marie Hasiová and Zuzana Drhová (Zelený Kruh). 
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NGOs operate is widely acknowledged to be a critical determinant of influence [Kriesi et 
al. 1995]. In the Czech case the political context has certainly fluctuated since the early 
1990s and, as demonstrated in the discussion below, this has clearly had an impact on the 
capacity of the environmental movement. However, it is the lack of resources available to 
NGOs which has had the most profound impact on their capacity to gain political influ-
ence. Despite recent political changes that have ushered in a more consensual and non-
combative arena for NGOs, their political capacity remains constrained by the absence of 
resources and a developed civil society capable of nurturing and resourcing associational 
activity. This is largely due to the legacy of four decades of soviet-style communism plus 
the political, social and economic turbulence of the ensuing transition process which in 
conjunction constitute a unique context in which fledgling NGOs are to operate. 
Various theoretical approaches to the study of social protest, used in conjunction, 
offer a set of analytical tools for considering aspects of environmental protest in the 
Czech Republic since the end of the 1980s [Della Porta and Diani 1999, ch. 1]. The role 
of environmental groups as a catch-all political opposition during the final months of the 
communist regime seems to lend credence to the structuralist-functionalist school, which 
depicts social movements as a conglomeration of the dispossessed and marginalised in a 
rapidly changing, crisis-ridden system [Smelser 1962]. The role of clandestine environ-
mentalists engaging in confrontational protest against the state during the 1980s, then 
gaining political influence and, in some cases, power after the revolution appears to en-
dorse a life-cycle trajectory whereby all social movements pass through radical confronta-
tional opposition to a phase of de-radicalisation in response to accommodation with the 
political elite [Offe 1990]. Indeed, the involvement of certain environmental NGOs in 
drafting new anti-pollution legislation immediately after the revolution, plus the gradual 
change in organisational structures and strategies suggests a more micro analytical ap-
proach based on resource availability and rational choice as a means of understanding the 
development of the environmental movement [Zald and McCarthy 1987]. 
However, the appropriateness of the various theoretical interpretations to the Czech 
case is somewhat superficial. Analysis of environmental protest cannot be extrapolated 
from the wider context of democratic consolidation. It is important, particularly with re-
gard to the cyclic trajectory, to resist deterministic and reductionist interpretations regard-
ing the eventual course of environmental protest. There has not been a linear progression 
whereby environmental NGOs have moved from a radical opposition movement to politi-
cal inclusion within the new democratic political system. In fact, the fledgling environ-
mental NGOs that emerged after the revolution lacked the experience, resources and 
cohesion to use the new political opportunity structure that was briefly made available to 
them. Moreover, the brief period of political inclusion after the revolution was eclipsed 
by a period of reactionary hostility, and within the space of three years the environmental 
movement found itself as excluded as it had been during the communist era. Although the 
period of flagrant hostility between the environmental movement and the government 
came to an end with the replacement of František Benda as minister of the environment 
after the 1996 election, and the relationship has subsequently improved quite considera-
bly, to suggest that by virtue of having regained a measure of political influence the envi-
ronmental movement has now completed the ‘cycle’ ignores the host of constraints that 
continue to limit their political capacity. 
To analyse the development of the environmental movement in the Czech Republic 
from the perspective of strategies and patterns of protest in Western Europe can serve to 
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misrepresent the post-communist political context and obscure a number of quite critical 
and specific constraints. For example, in the aftermath of the Velvet Revolution the re-
cently ‘liberated’ environmentalists appeared to be rejecting conventional pressure group 
activity in favour of strategies and organisational forms characterised by western social 
scientists as a new form of social protest [Melucci 1985; Eder 1985; Dalton, Kuechler 
and Burklin 1990; Touraine 1981, 1988]. However, such radical tactics and approaches 
were more a reflection of environmental protest having emerged within the authoritarian 
political setting of communist rule and of young activists lacking any political experience 
than an outright rejection of more conventional forms of protest and organisation. Simi-
larly the abandonment of radicalism and the emergence of more conventional lobby-
based strategies after 1992 was not, as might be assumed, a sign that environmental 
NGOs had gained greater access or inclusion within the policy process. Indeed, despite 
adopting less confrontational and more conciliatory tactics, NGOs were being squeezed 
out of the political fray at this time due to the absence of resources and the lack of any 
political patronage. The former dissidents had virtually all left formal politics, and the 
fragmented opposition seemed largely disinterested in the environmental issue. 
What will become evident from the analysis of environmental protest in the Czech 
Republic over the past decade is that while the relationship between the environmental 
sector and the political elite has certainly been important in determining strategy choice 
and influence, the issue of resources and the broader context of establishing civil society 
is paramount in terms of analysing the capacity of the environmental movement. 
1989-1991: A Halcyon Era of Political Inclusion? 
In the months prior to the Velvet Revolution the number of environmental organisations 
increased dramatically. Though there is a long tradition of conservation and ecological 
consciousness in the Czech lands [Tickle and Vavroušek 1998: 122-124], by the 1980s 
the deteriorating state of the environment and its impact upon public health provoked a 
political response among intellectuals, conservationists, dissidents and the general public. 
Spontaneous public demonstrations over the levels of smog in north Bohemia, the forma-
tion of groups, such as Prague Mothers, and the politicisation of academics and conserva-
tionists within state organisations provided a fertile base for the development of 
environmental associations. In the months prior to the revolution the environmental issue 
had attracted an array of political dissidents who recognised its potential to further embar-
rass the embattled regime. The involvement of such activists served to link the nascent 
environmental movement to the larger clandestine dissident movement. 
In the aftermath of the revolution a host of new organisations emerged. By early 
1990 an estimated 800 groups existed [Šilhanová et al. 1994, 1996]. The new environ-
mental NGOs consisted typically of young students who had been drawn to the environ-
mental issue during the months prior to the Velvet Revolution via state organisations such 
as the Czechoslovak Union of Nature Conservationists (Český svaz ochránců přírody – 
ČSOP), which had been established in 1979, or Brontosaurus, the conservation branch of 
the Socialist Youth Union [Tickle and Vavroušek 1998: 125, Waller 1989]. These new 
NGOs were small amorphous organisations that lacked cohesive internal structures. There 
was also a great deal of overlap between groups in terms of the campaign issues and the 
activists involved. NGOs were offered practical and financial assistance from a variety of 
external agencies, including the Swedish environmental organisation Secretariat on Acid 
Rain, philanthropic foundations such as USAID, the German Marshall Fund (committed 
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to economic restructuring in eastern Europe), the British Know-How Fund, and from 
1991 EU funding via the Phare Programme. NGOs received virtually no money from 
Czech citizens, nor did they seek to establish a fee-paying membership, preferring a hand-
ful of active members to passive supporters. 
The organisation Hnutí Duha (Rainbow Movement), though it became one of the 
largest and most prominent NGOs, typified the nature of environmental protest at this 
time.3 Duha activists rejected a formal hierarchic organisational structure and the notion 
of non-active supporters, preferring activists to work independently on particular issues 
that were broadly defined by the ‘centre of operations’ in Brno. Though Duha has subse-
quently become one of the most politically prominent environmental lobbying groups, in 
the early 1990s it rejected a ‘parliamentary’ strategy and a hierarchic internal organisa-
tional structure in favour of direct action based on a global agenda and an amorphous 
cell-like internal structure. 
Despite their global rather than national focus and a reluctance to embrace ‘formal’ 
politics, the larger Prague-based NGOs did enjoy close links with the newly established 
environmental agencies, and their opinions on policy were widely canvassed. This can be 
attributed largely to the collectivist attitude of the new dissident-based political elite. The 
first post-communist Czech environmental minister, Bedřich Moldan, and the new federal 
minister, Josef Vavroušek, had both been active in the Czechoslovak Academy of Sci-
ences Ecological Section before 1989, and had been critical of government policy [Waller 
and Millard 1992: 170]. In their new governmental roles they sought close co-operation 
with the environmental NGOs and activists who they had campaigned alongside months 
before. This sentiment of co-operation and consensus found its most explicit institutional 
expression in the formation of the Green Parliament in early 1990. The objective of the 
Parliament was to create a discursive forum in which a wide array of environmental 
NGOs and officials could co-operate in the formation of a programme for environmental 
regeneration. The role and function of the Green Parliament were outlined in a document 
drawn up by the Czech Ministry of the Environment in 1990. The Parliament was de-
scribed as ‘an assembly of NGO representatives, to whom all the Ministry’s significant 
plans shall be submitted for consultation and opinions’ [Moldan 1990: 22]. The Parlia-
ment was to meet regularly at the Czech Ministry of the Environment in Prague, and al-
though its recommendations were not prescribed as binding on the Ministry, there was a 
sense in which the new officials, lacking experience in policy-making and administration, 
were keen to consult interested parties. In the early months of the Green Parliament, the 
larger Prague-based groups such as Greenpeace, Děti Země (Children of the Earth), Hnutí 
Duha benefited most from the Green Parliament, and through it enjoyed close access to 
the policy process. 
However, the seemingly ideal relationship between the various strands of the envi-
ronmental sector concealed a number of underlying tensions. The greatest problem dis-
tracting the environmental movement until the mid-1990s was that the false unity of the 
environmental movement during the final months of communism had been fractured by 
the collapse of the old regime in November 1989. Mirroring wider political developments 
within Civic Forum, environmental activists had now to confront ideological differences 
                                                     
3) Information on Hnutí Duha was obtained from a series of interviews with Daniel Vondrouš 
between 1994-1999. Vondrouš has been a key figure in the organisation since its inception and is 
now its main lobbyist. 
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and degrees of ‘greenness’ that had previously been eclipsed by their unifying opposition 
to Soviet-style communism. In addition, the environmental movement lost its upper-tier 
of activists as a result of political change. Many key figures at the time of the Velvet 
Revolution were now either engaged in government or on the fringes of formal political 
power (for example, Bedřich Moldan, Josef Vavroušek and Ivan Dejmal, who had been 
key figures within the movement, were now part of the new state environmental agen-
cies). Although co-operation between the new elite and NGOs was close, their involve-
ment and expertise within the protest movement was difficult to replace. Other former 
activists had retreated into academia, science or apolitical conservation; others simply left 
the political arena for the newly reclaimed private sphere, or indeed the new private sec-
tor. 
Though certain environmental NGOs did exert a degree of influence on the new 
policy process via the Green Parliament and through close personal links with officials, 
the climate of co-operation and consensus was hindered by the fact that the NGOs needed 
to adjust to the changed political circumstances. Environmental protest had emerged as 
illegal or semi-legal clandestine opposition movements under authoritarian rule, en-
meshed within a submerged and highly politicised ‘parallel polis’ [Havel 1985, Tismane-
anu 1993: 153-174]. Environmental protest had occupied a uniquely political position 
during 1988-1989. An alliance of scientists, intellectuals, conservationists and sections of 
the general public had formed under the environmental banner. As a semi-legal activity 
apparently encouraged by the Communist Party, conservation had political potential as a 
means of lambasting the regime from a relatively safe quarter. The degradation of the 
natural environment also seemed to reflect and encapsulate all that was wrong with the 
political and economic system. In conjunction with other activists and dissidents (e.g. 
musicians, artists, peace campaigners) the clandestine environmental movement became a 
de facto opposition force within the closed and non-pluralistic Soviet-style political sys-
tem. But after 1989, the environmental NGOs were required to enter the formal political 
sphere and co-operate and negotiate with the new democratic regime. They were being 
invited to sit round a table and help draw up a concrete policy framework; they needed to 
deal in facts and realistic strategies in order to help ameliorate the ecological degradation 
of the preceding decades. Though in the period just prior to the revolution environmental-
ists had deployed more overtly political tactics which included organising public meet-
ings, leaking information to journalists and more open confrontation with the regime 
[Tickle and Vavroušek 1998: 127-129], the Czech communist leadership’s authoritarian 
response and refusal to embrace the slightest liberalisation contrasted with events in Po-
land and Hungary and had not enabled environmentalists to gain the political experience 
that they now required. That the nascent NGOs lacked internal structures, cohesive ideo-
logical platforms on domestic issues, and appeared to shun the formal political policy 
process in favour of remaining enmeshed within a nascent civil society was a reflection of 
the circumstances in which they had emerged and operated during the final months of 
communist rule rather than a wholesale rejection of conventional Western-style activity. 
One of the most fundamental considerations at this time was the question of what 
role NGOs should play in the new political order. Some environmentalists who had be-
come politically involved during the last months of the communist regime now argued 
that the creation of new environmental agencies plus the ascendancy of the new pro-
environment elite deemed the role of NGOs unnecessary. Others stressed the continued 
importance of environmental protest within democratic politics and were concerned by 
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the apparent apathy of others with regard to critical issues such as nuclear energy that 
were being debated at this time. Those advocating a continued role for independent envi-
ronmental NGOs were further divided over the nature of protest. Fearful of destabilising 
the new regime, some activists urged restraint and were unwilling to counter the notion of 
radical direct action within the new democratic system. Other more radical elements were 
reluctant to become enmeshed within formal politics at the national level and rejected 
conventional strategies in favour of more radical symbolic protest (e.g. the blockade of 
the proposed nuclear plant at Temelín). The need to adapt, to carve out a new role within 
post-communist politics and to alter patterns of internal organisation and strategy led to 
bitter rifts within the environmental movement which essentially paralysed effective mo-
bilisation. Ideological disagreement over the nuclear energy issue and opposition to the 
Temelín plant in southern Bohemia led to the demise of the Green Parliament as NGOs 
fragmented, reformed, argued and, in many cases, folded. 
There was something unusual in the fact that during the eighteen-month period af-
ter the revolution the environmental regeneration of the country was being propelled by 
the new ministers and state officials rather than by pressure from NGOs, who were dis-
tracted by internal ideological disputes and the need to adapt to the changed political con-
text. Indeed, despite the ambitions of the Green Parliament, the rapidly constructed 
framework of environmental legislation was principally established by those within the 
new agencies with the help of certain activists and experts from the non-governmental 
green movement. Reluctant to work with each other, to widen their support base, or con-
template more mundane issues, the NGOs became increasingly detached from the formal 
policy process. In this sense the spirit of co-operation of the new political elite had come 
too early for NGOs who could not take advantage of the political climate. What was 
missing at this time was a sphere of environmental NGOs with the aptitude and expertise 
to co-operate at an elite level and to take advantage of the political climate of consensus. 
There was a sense in which the political elite were waiting for environmental NGOs to 
adapt and take up positions around the negotiating table. Unfortunately, elite-level politi-
cal change towards the end of 1991 – the fragmentation of Civic Forum and the emer-
gence of competitive political parties – ended this spirit of consensus, and by the time the 
NGOs had adapted and reformed their involvement was no longer sought. 
Political Marginalisation: 1992-1996 
That the fledgling Czech environmental movement was beset by ideological rifts after the 
revolution is hardly surprising. A polarisation between more moderate NGOs willing to 
engage with the political elite, and more radical elements that would pursue alternative 
strategies from within civil society typifies environmental politics across Europe [Young 
1992]. However, what in fact occurred in the Czech case was that the radical protest and 
ideology of the immediate post-revolutionary period all but vanished. Although there 
emerged a core of Prague-based NGOs which gradually pursued a more moderate and 
increasingly state-focused strategy (e.g. Greenpeace, Duha and Děti Země), they were not 
co-opted within the political process and were in fact politically ostracised and castigated 
throughout the 1992-1996 period. 
The role of environmental NGOs within post-communist politics had begun to 
change during the second half of 1991, largely as a result of the break-up of Civic Forum 
and the political demise of the dissident-based elite. However, it was the election of 
Václav Klaus and the centre-right coalition in June 1992 that contributed most to the po-
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litical marginalisation of environmental NGOs. As a broad-based movement, Civic Fo-
rum had tried to establish a political climate of consensus that was poignantly reflected in 
the Green Parliament initiative. The fragmentation of Civic Forum in 1991 and the subse-
quent emergence of western-style adversarial party politics profoundly altered the politi-
cal framework in which environmental NGOs were to operate. The environmental issue 
became engulfed in the emerging ideological rift between forces on the political right 
advocating neo-liberal shock-therapy, rapid wealth creation and a deregulated society, 
and the non-communist centre-left who emphasised a more gradualist approach, civic 
rights and environmental protection [Jehlička and Kára 1994: 159]. Public concern over 
the environment had already begun to decline as the impact of economic restructuring 
took hold. The victory of Václav Klaus and his right-of-centre coalition in the June 1992 
election signified the end of consensus politics and ushered in a climate of hedonistic 
individualism in which concern for the environment was suddenly politically unfashion-
able. 
The political and economic reforms of the Klaus era had an impact on environ-
mental protest in a number of ways. The most obvious impact was the political marginali-
sation of the environmental movement. Instead of dealing with an environmental minister 
and set of officials who had themselves been activists and who sought to establish a pro-
gressive policy framework through consultation with the environmental movement, 
NGOs had now to face a political elite whose main objective was to curtail the regulatory 
role of the state in order to ensure rapid economic liberalisation. As opponents of untem-
pered, unregulated growth, environmental NGOs were immediately identified as political 
enemies. Further environmental regulation was viewed as an impediment to the economic 
agenda and dismissed as the ‘icing on the cake’ – something to be dealt with in the future 
once a prosperous market economy had been established [Klaus 1994]. In a move de-
signed to further marginalise the environment as a political issue, the ministerial portfolio 
was handed to František Benda who, as a member of ODA (Občanská demokratická 
aliance – Civic Democratic Alliance), was politically weak within a coalition government 
dominated by ODS (Občanská demokratická strana – Civic Democratic Party).4 Far from 
there being any consultation between government and the environmental movement, 
Benda simply refused to meet NGOs and to set up any formal dialogue throughout his 
term of office. Such antipathy towards the environmental sector reached a nadir in early 
1995 when three leading environmental NGOs were included on a security services’ list 
of ‘subversive organisations’ which were to be the target of surveillance. The fact that the 
three environmental associations included on this list were committed to non-violent pro-
test and to working within the democratic process, and that the other groups on the list 
were far-right neo-fascist organisations, provoked political outrage. President Havel in-
tervened, as did a number of journalists and prominent figures in Czech society. As a 
result, two out of the three groups were eventually removed from the list [Fagin and Jeh-
licka 1998]. 
                                                     
4) Initially, Benda remained loyal to Klaus and was keen to demonstrate his neo-liberal credentials 
by cutting funding to NGOs and to endorse the ‘icing-on the cake’ rhetoric of the prime minister 
However, as ODA’s relationship with Prime Minister Klaus deteriorated Benda used the environ-
ment as a political tool: towards the end of his tenure he attempted to court environmental NGOs 
in a blatant attempt to humiliate the leadership. 
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Not only were environmental NGOs politically marginalised and pilloried during 
this period, the environmental policy process that had been vigorously established in 
1990 essentially ceased to exist. Apart from the odd amendment, virtually no new envi-
ronmental laws were prepared or enacted between 1992 and 1996. Indeed, for much of 
this period there did not exist a long-term environmental plan or a set of future objectives. 
The prepared draft ‘State Environmental Policy’ was rejected by the government three 
times and was only finally passed in August 1995 after the withdrawal of any reference to 
sustainable development, a concept bitterly contested by Václav Klaus [Slocock 1996, 
Fagin and Jehlička 1998: 118]. The absence of a policy framework essentially removed 
the formal political stage on which the interaction between NGOs and the state occurred. 
Not only environmental policy was halted during this period, the development of a 
legal and constitutional framework for associational activity in general also stagnated. 
The delay in establishing a coherent legal and fiscal framework for civil associations af-
fected environmental NGOs. Though the Law on Associations had been included in the 
1991 Civil Code and Constitution, subsequent legislation was required to clarify the legal 
position of foundations, civic associations, and non-profit organisations with regard to 
their basic right to exist and their fiscal rights with regard to tax exemption on donations. 
Under pressure from sections of the non-profit sector the Klaus government did finally 
enact the Law on Public Benefit Societies in 1995, though the act failed to clarify the 
legal position of civil associations such as environmental groups that do not ostensibly 
exist to provide public benefit, own property, or distribute grants. There was a certain 
irony in the fact that until recently environmental NGOs claimed the legal right to operate 
and raise funds on the strength of antiquated communist legislation. Klaus’s often-
expressed ideological antipathy towards such collectivist emblems as non-profit organisa-
tions, NGOs and civil associations explains the delay in establishing such a legal frame-
work.5 
The first dissident-led administration after 1990 had identified the importance of 
information relating to the environment being widely available [Moldan 1990]. It was 
recognised that environmental regeneration depended upon openness and co-operation 
based on the free flow of information between the new state agencies, NGOs, and the 
public. However, somewhat reminiscent of the later communist period, information relat-
ing to the environment became a political weapon in the adversarial and confrontational 
exchanges between the ministry and NGOs after 1992. It was thus not until 1997, after 
the political demise of both Klaus and Benda, that a freedom of information act relating 
to environmental information was enacted.6 
The inertia of the Klaus government with regard to implementing the wide-ranging 
local government reform enshrined in the constitution also served to weaken the political 
capacity of local environmental NGOs. The success of the new Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) process, which had been introduced during the 1990-1991 period but 
only came into effect after the 1992 election, depended on administrative reform and the 
                                                     
5) For an insight into Klaus’s vision of civil society see [Havel, Klaus and Pithart 1996]. 
6) It was during the brief period of Martin Bursík’s tenure at the Ministry of the Environment that 
information became freely available (on the Internet) and all files were opened and made available 
to NGOs (interview with Petr Štěpánek, former spokesperson for Martin Bursík, and Director of 
Public Relations at the Ministry). The Social Democratic government finally enacted a general 
Freedom of Information Act in May 1999. 
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devolvement of power and responsibility to local government and planners. In the ab-
sence of such reform the process was thwarted by a combination of the lack of authority 
and prolonged tenure of communist officials reluctant to facilitate NGO and public in-
volvement within the EIA process. 
It was during the Klaus era that environmental NGOs began to experience a finan-
cial crisis that was to have a profound impact on their activities. The crisis was precipi-
tated partly by changes in patterns of state funding on which environmental NGOs relied 
in the absence of sufficient levels of donations to NGOs from sections of Czech society 
(sections of the middle classes who typically fund environmental organisations elsewhere 
still lack sufficient levels of disposable income to make substantial donations), environ-
mental NGOs have had to rely in the short term on the provision of state support and on 
donations from external agencies. 
In recognition of the need for the state to support nascent civil associations, the 
first post-communist administration had established the State Fund for the Environment. 
This was to consist of the revenue from fines and licences paid by polluters. Half of the 
proceeds were to be made available, via the Ministry of Environment, to environmental 
NGOs and in particular to help establish an infrastructure within the sector. Thus organi-
sations such as Zelený kruh (Green Circle), established to help co-ordinate the activities 
of NGOs and to strengthen the representation of environmental issues within the policy 
process, were to benefit. However, from 1992 onward, grants from the Ministry of the 
Environment were directed away from the more politically oriented NGOs and from pro-
jects seeking to strengthen the sector as a whole (e.g. information flow, resources, cam-
paign expertise etc.) towards apolitical conservation projects. Thus Zelený kruh was 
denied funding for much of the period on the basis that it was not actually involved in 
conservation work. It has since been revealed that a sizeable amount of the funds suppos-
edly available to NGOs from the State Fund for the Environment was actually directed 
towards private sector projects such as the building of incinerators, the environmental 
value of which is widely disputed.7 NGOs were also supposed to benefit from the Fond 
národního majetku – Fund of National Property, which is essentially a small proportion 
of the revenue from privatisation. However, the distribution of this money was continu-
ally delayed throughout the Klaus period and was only allocated to NGOs in early 1999. 
Although the environmental movement had begun to fragment shortly after the 
Velvet Revolution, the lack of adequate funding augmented divisions within the sector 
and effectively narrowed ideological diversity. As state grants were rationalised, NGOs 
became locked in a competitive struggle over the small grants that were still available. 
The political effect of such competition was a reluctance to co-operate with each other 
which further weakened the political efficacy of the environmental movement. But per-
haps the most critical dimension of the financial crisis was that NGOs reacted to the po-
litical and economic climate and the apparent decline in support for the environment 
among the general public by rejecting their radical strategies and ideological platforms. 
The only visible occurrence of mild direct action was an annual blockade of the Temelín 
power plant. By 1996 Greenpeace no longer participated in the event and increasingly 
opposition to the nuclear energy issue was down-played in favour of less controversial 
issues or was approached from a less radical angle. For example, Duha worked with local 
                                                     
7) Interview with Petr Štěpánek, November 1998. 
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groups opposing the building of nuclear waste storage sites in various areas across the 
country, but did not openly campaign against Temelín during this period. The NGOs did 
face a difficult task in campaigning against nuclear power as there had seemingly 
emerged a consensus which regarded nuclear energy as a ‘clean’ alternative to brown-
coal power plants. Though Děti Země and other NGOs did present alternative scenarios in 
their publications and reports, their lack of political access and inadequate resources made 
it difficult to stage an effective campaign. The only viable strategy seemed to be taking 
up local NIMBY campaigns against less controversial issues oriented around conserva-
tion. 
The fact that the political and economic context encouraged environmental NGOs 
to adopt a more professional and less radical approach during this period can be viewed 
as a positive long-term development. In the sense that a stratum of NGOs willing to oper-
ate within the policy process was clearly missing in the earlier period, the emergence of 
less radical more state-oriented NGOs prepared to co-operate at an elite level seems an 
encouraging development. Yet the strategy bore little or no political dividend for NGOs 
during this period. Indeed, the three environmental NGOs included on the security ser-
vices list of ‘subversive groups’ had all rejected direct action, and had sought to promote 
their professional image. 
As state grants dwindled and the prospect of receiving donations from the Czech 
public and organisations was thwarted by the effects of economic restructuring, environ-
mental NGOs became almost entirely reliant on the funding provided by external agen-
cies. However, in light of the relative success of the political and economic transition in 
the Czech Republic, donations to Czech NGOs were rationalised and donors began to 
target their assistance elsewhere. The focus of attention began to shift from the relatively 
stable and prosperous Central Europe to areas of south-east Europe and parts of the for-
mer Yugoslavia. This was a period of recession across Europe and America, and interna-
tional foundations and donors were forced to rationalise their support for Eastern 
European NGOs. Even Czech Greenpeace, which receives the bulk of its income from its 
international parent organisation and has never sought nor accepted state funding, also 
experienced funding difficulties as a result of financial constraints within the international 
organisation at this time. Unable to rely on substantial public donations, the Czech branch 
suffered more than Greenpeace branches elsewhere and the director was at one point 
forced to consider, against the wishes of Greenpeace International, corporate sponsor-
ship.8 Levels of foreign donations to Czech NGOs have never recovered and the threat of 
further cuts and withdrawals continues to cast a shadow over the future of many envi-
ronmental NGOs that remain dependent on external funding. By 1996 the American Ford 
Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the US Peace Corps and USAID had completely 
withdrawn from the Czech Republic; C.S. Mott (US) had rationalised its assistance and 
EU money (through the PHARE programme) is increasingly being targeted towards pro-
jects that strengthen the economic infrastructure in view of possible Czech accession in 
the next decade. 
By the mid-1990s environmental NGOs were essentially locked in a situation 
whereby their main sources of funding were in decline. There was a need to develop a 
base of fee-paying supporters from among Czech society. As noted above, this strategy 
                                                     
8) Interview with Hana Pernicová, Director of Greenpeace ČR, June 1995. 
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was hindered by the fact that levels of disposable income amongst citizens inclined to 
support environmental NGOs were not high enough to enable sizeable donations, and 
also by the fact that the NGOs themselves were only gradually coming round to the idea 
of non-active fee-paying members. For instance, in 1995 Czech Greenpeace had barely 
400 listed supporters, despite the commitment of the organisation internationally to ac-
cept passive fee-paying supporters [Rucht 1995]. Apart from the fact that most NGOs 
lacked the resources to invest in fund-raising expertise, there was (and remains) a distinct 
lack of fund-raising expertise in the country available to those NGOs willing to venture 
down this path. While the larger NGOs with international links (such as Greenpeace) 
were able to create a more professional image and develop their expertise during the 
1992-1996 period, smaller groups were hindered by a lack of resources to acquire trained 
staff, accountants, legal advisers and even premises from which to operate. 
The 1992-1996 period was the nadir for the environmental movement in the Czech 
Republic and a stark contrast to the immediate post-revolutionary period. In addition to 
the lack of resources and political marginalisation, the environmental movement now 
faced a public who were less sympathetic to its cause. Although environmental activists 
in the earlier period had made little attempt to court public support or establish a constitu-
ency of supporters from a wider section of the community, the climate of concern about 
pollution and its effects on health at the time of the Velvet Revolution created a positive 
backdrop to their activities [Ivan Dejmal in Lamper, Macháček a Petráček 1993: 9].9 The 
impact of economic restructuring was now being felt, and public attention was focused on 
such ‘material’ issues as housing and employment. There was also little public support 
for radical tactics. The legacy of four decades of communist rule on political attitudes and 
values was a deferential political culture and a fear of radicalism. Environmentalists were 
seen by many as attempting to rock the political boat and thus a threat to democracy. The 
Klaus government undoubtedly pandered to this viewpoint by portraying environmental-
ists as enemies of reform. 
If during the early period the environmental movement consisted of too many radi-
cal organisations and lacked more conventional groups willing to lobby parliament and 
focus on domestic issues, the legacy of the 1992-1996 period was precisely the reverse. 
By the end of 1995 the environmental NGOs that had survived had responded to the fi-
nancial crisis and political exclusion by jettisoning radical strategies and ideological plat-
forms. In fear of public reaction and government recrimination, the main NGOs were 
reluctant to contemplate any degree of direct action. 
However, it has to be recognised that while the period 1992-1996 was generally a 
low point in terms of political influence and the development of the environmental 
movement in general, a small number of the larger NGOs who had links to large global 
organisations did manage to become more professional and began to focus on national 
issues and to lobbying parliament as a strategy. Though such attempts initially bore little 
fruit, by 1996 a small core of environmental NGOs (e.g. Greenpeace, Duha, Děti Země, 
                                                     
9) During 1990 the environment remained a key political issue. When one public opinion poll 
conducted by sociologists from Charles University asked respondents to name the most important 
issues for the new government to deal with, 83% named the environment as the most important 
issue [Jehlička and Kára 1994]. 
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Society for Sustainable Living) were well informed, were prepared to work closely at an 
elite level, and were adept at producing well-researched reports and proposals.10 
A Political Renaissance? 
Just as the fragmentation of Civic Forum in 1991 and the change of government in June 
1992 had had a direct impact on the environmental sector, so the loss of an overall major-
ity for Klaus’s ODS-led coalition in the 1996 election marked the first tentative steps 
towards a new era for the environmental movement. The replacement of František Benda 
as environmental minister with Jiří Skalický, a respected politician and fierce critic of 
Klaus, ushered in what might be termed a normalisation of relations between environ-
mental NGOs and the ministry. The climate of outright hostility was replaced by a period 
of tentative co-operation between the more prominent Prague-based NGOs and a tactical 
politician. One of Skalický’s first actions was to invite representatives of NGOs to a 
meeting at the ministry at which he expressed a desire for open dialogue. There was now 
also mounting pressure on the Czech Republic from the EU and the OECD to improve 
environmental regulation. The original framework of laws and instruments enacted after 
the Velvet Revolution had not been improved or extended, and future entry to both or-
ganisations depended on tighter and more extensive environmental regulation. In addition 
to opening up a new political opportunity structure for NGOs, the accession of Skalický 
also broke the legislative deadlock of the Benda years by drafting new legislation on 
waste. One of his first actions was to reduce energy subsidies, a policy that Greenpeace 
had been advocating for a considerable time. Whether out of a real commitment by Ska-
lický to incorporate NGOs within the drafting of the legislation, or simply due to the fact 
that he became increasingly distracted by political tensions within the embattled coalition, 
Greenpeace was able to exert a significant influence over the new waste law, inserting a 
clause banning the import of goods containing PVC by the year 2001. This clause repre-
sented the most radical aspect of the legislation and extended the legislation beyond 
norms elsewhere in Europe. There was also contact between NGOs and the ministry on 
issues such as motorway development and energy policy. 
As political events rapidly changed in the ensuing months, the political influence 
and position of environmental NGOs was to improve quite dramatically. The crisis which 
finally engulfed Klaus’s embattled coalition towards the end of 1997 resulted in the for-
mation of a caretaker government prior to the elections to be held in June 1998. Under the 
brief tenure of Martin Bursík as minister of the environment, NGOs enjoyed an unprece-
dented degree of influence and were granted unrestricted access to the process of begin-
ning to draft and update existing environmental legislation.11 The temporary government 
                                                     
10) The role played by Greenpeace at the time of the floods in Moravia in early 1997 provides a 
good illustration of how far environmental NGOs had travelled towards becoming professional 
organisations. Greenpeace established the Phoenix Project urging the incorporation of solar energy 
within the re-building of all the destroyed villages. The project received wide-spread support from 
politicians, ministers, local politicians and notably the president (Interview with Hana Pernicová, 
former Director of Greenpeace ČR, November 1998). 
11) In terms of actual new legislation this period produced very little. This is largely because Bur-
sík’s four month tenure made it impossible for him to draft new laws and get them through parlia-
ment – indeed, his first day in office was the last opportunity for the submission of draft legislation 
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to which Bursík belonged was not bound by party discipline nor ideological rift (Bursík 
himself was politically and financially independent). His approach was to work with 
other ministries and to portray the environment as an integral part of all policy issues 
rather than trying to get more power for the Ministry of the Environment. This marked a 
significant departure from the approach of his predecessors (and even his successor, 
Miloš Kužvart) in the sense that, regardless of the political complexion of successive 
governments, there had always been a power battle between the environmental ministry, 
seen as insignificant and politically marginal, and other ministries such as industry. This 
erects a further barrier to the political influence of the environmental movement. Bursík’s 
accession also marked the return of former dissidents to environmental politics. Involved 
with the human rights group HOS (Movement for Unjustly Pursued People), Bursík had 
forged links with environmental campaigners such as Ivan Dejmal and other prominent 
members of the clandestine Ecological Society in the 1980s. Some of those environmen-
talists were now involved with the Society for Sustainable Living and, not surprisingly, 
were invited to assist in up-dating environmental policy. Unfortunately, as part of a care-
taker government, Bursík was in office for less than three months and was therefore un-
able to enact much new legislation (his third day in office was actually the last day for 
submitting policy to the parliament). 
Since the election in June 1998 of a Social Democratic minority government, the 
political prominence of environmental NGOs established during the Bursík period has 
been maintained. There are clearly parallels with the early post-revolutionary period in 
the sense that a network of pro-environment politicians, lawyers and NGO activists has 
emerged, and there is once again an overlap between the NGO sector and state agencies 
and officials. The new minister, Miloš Kužvart, is a geologist and former member of the 
pre-1989 dissident environmental association, the Ecological Society. More recently he 
has been involved with the non-governmental sector, having worked for NROS (Nadace 
rozvoje občanské společnosti – Civil Society Development Foundation), the Czech or-
ganisation that distributes PHARE money to NGOs, and he is still a member of the highly 
influential Society for Sustainable Living. The Green Parliament has been re-established 
as a forum for consultation between the ministry and NGOs, and a new Legislative Group 
of environmental NGOs has also been established, which is sent draft copies of new laws 
and is asked to return comments and suggestions. 
How has the environmental movement changed? The most visible dimension of the 
environmental movement is a core of Prague-based political NGOs (Greenpeace, Duha, 
Děti Země, Society for Sustainable Living). After four years in the political wilderness, 
these groups now enjoy a degree of influence and access to the policy process. Most of 
the prominent groups have now adopted a more conventional organisational structure and 
are directed by older (aged thirty plus) people who typically possess specialised higher-
education qualifications in the natural sciences, management or the social sciences. 
Though this new management elite has been recruited quite recently in an attempt to in-
ject more professionalism into NGOs, some of the current activists have remained within 
their organisations since the early 1990s. This marks a distinct contrast with the early 
1990s when, after the older generation of activists had moved into government or else-
                                                                                                                                                 
legislation to parliament. However, the foundations of a new policy agenda were laid during this 
brief period. 
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where, the environmental movement consisted of a transient core of students under 
twenty-five. 
In addition to political NGOs, the long established conservation groups such as 
ČSOP and Brontosaurus remain active. Although such groups became politicised at the 
time of the revolution they have largely moved away from political involvement in the 
post-communist period.12 Indeed, as restrictions were placed on the availability of state 
funding during the 1992-1996 period, ČSOP sought to emphasise its conservationist apo-
litical nature and, perhaps as a result, was the recipient of a sizeable proportion of the 
total amount of funding available to NGOs. The organisation has also received funding 
from the Czech National Savings Bank.13 Other NGOs that were once more radical and 
appeared to be following a political path have subsequently fallen into the ranks of the 
apolitical conservationists. For example, the environmental NGO Tereza, one of the most 
prominent organisations in the 1989-1991 period, established to promote environmental 
awareness among children, now prides itself on its apolitical position and seeks to dis-
tance itself from environmental issues within the political sphere (such as nuclear energy, 
transport etc.). The director of the organisation sees no contradiction in the recent deci-
sion to accept financial support form ČEZ (the Czech energy company) and Coca-Cola. It 
received payment from the latter for advising the multinational corporation on a green 
strategy for its advertising campaigns in the Czech Republic.14 
Although Prague-based groups remain prominent, there exists a network of active 
local environmental NGOs has emerged focusing on specific local issues. An example of 
such activity is Přátelé přírody (Friends of Nature) in Ústí nad Labem which has 
mounted a campaign against the building of dams on the Elbe. The Prague-based NGOs 
have begun to work with such groups as part of the Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) process, providing resources, advice and a link to the national political arena. Al-
though even the larger local groups tend to rely on unpaid active volunteers, there is a 
recognition of the importance of public relations and successful media campaigns.15 
There would also appear to be a renewed willingness by the larger NGOs to com-
bine lobbying with carefully orchestrated direct action, reflecting the campaign strategies 
currently being pursued by environmental campaigners across Europe. After a period 
during which Czech Greenpeace and other NGOs were unsure about the value and appro-
priateness of publicity campaigns and were reluctant to use even mild direct action, more 
radical tactics directed at mobilising the public and humiliating polluters have recently 
been pursued: a Greenpeace campaign in 1997 against the Syntesia chemical plant in 
Pardubice was successful in winning widespread public support for the issue of tighter 
regulation of industrial effluent. Invited on a river ‘tour’, the public were offered foul 
smelling polluted water in wine glasses which had been discharged directly from the 
chemical plant. 
This change of strategy is clearly linked to an apparent alteration in the attitude of 
the public towards the environment. When asked about environmental organisations in a 
                                                     
12) There are still radical elements within both these organisations, for example, the Brno branch 
of ČSOP. 
13) Interview with Bedřich Moldan, 15 July, 1997. 
14) Interview with Jana Ledvunová, Director of Tereza, 17 July, 1997. 
15) Interview with Hana Konvalinková, Duha (Olomouc), 11 May, 1999. 
Adam Fagin: Environmental Protest in the Czech Republic 
153 
national opinion poll survey towards the end of 1996, 87% of respondents said they were 
useful and important.16 More significantly, recent evidence suggests that the public may 
be better placed to offer financial support to NGOs. On a recent fund-raising campaign, 
Greenpeace more than tripled its donations from the public. For the first time some of the 
larger NGOs are now starting to keep lists of supporters and are targeting their fund rais-
ing accordingly. Apart from Greenpeace, other NGOs are still quite reluctant to accept 
subscription-paying passive members. Although low levels of disposable income amongst 
potential donors remains an obstacle to NGOs obtaining the sort of funding received by 
organisations elsewhere, the environmental movement clearly needs to consider the issue 
of fund-raising and to develop greater expertise. 
The political circumstances surrounding the government’s decision in May 1999 to 
continue with the Temelín nuclear power plant reveals a great deal about the changed 
relationship between NGOs and the government. It also provides an illustration of how 
the strategies of NGOs have also altered since the early 1990s. On one level the govern-
ment’s decision to continue subsidising the ill-fated scheme suggests that despite the 
more consensual and open political climate and the renewed influence of NGOs, the 
movement remains weak in the face of powerful political and economic interests. How-
ever, in conjunction with Greenpeace and other smaller NGOs, Duha orchestrated a high-
profile campaign which coherently challenged the efficiency and economic rationale be-
hind the pro-Temelín lobby. Indeed in the days before the decision was announced, Duha 
were actually briefing President Havel, who had decided to openly oppose the completion 
of the plant.17 Moreover, the NGO campaign, which focused almost entirely on the eco-
nomic cost and inefficiencies involved if the government were to continue with the pro-
ject, was arguably an appropriate response to the government’s apparent determination to 
base the final decision on such considerations. The NGO campaign was well informed 
and highly professional. 
However, NGOs are still adversely affected by inadequate levels of funding. 
Though apparently committed to working with NGOs, the new government has yet to 
alter the basis on which ministry funds are allocated. It has been declared that funding 
received by NGOs as part of the recently released proceeds from privatisation cannot be 
used to pay salaries but must be used for projects related to conservation. As a result, the 
more politically oriented organisations such as the Prague-based NGO Zelený kruh, 
which exists to strengthen the infrastructure of the environmental sector, cannot benefit. 
Although smaller NGOs operating outside of Prague and other main cities are all 
affected by the absence of sustainable and sufficient levels of funding, it would appear 
that the specific political opportunity structure at the municipal level accounts for a great 
deal. Political attitudes within the locality is also a critical factor. For example, the České 
Budějovice-based NGO Jihočeské matky (South-Bohemian Mothers) has remained radi-
cal in terms of its campaigns and has not adopted a more formal and ‘professional’ inter-
nal organisational structure. The organisation is one of the few remaining NGOs in the 
Czech Republic to have actively opposed the completion of the Temelín power plant in 
Southern Bohemia throughout the past decade. The situative context in which the organi-
sation has pursued its anti-Temelín campaign has been a major constraint. The local po-
                                                     
16) The survey was conducted in November 1996 by the Institute for Public Opinion Research. 
17) Interview with Vojtěch Kotecký, Hnuti Duha, 14 May, 1999. 
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litical elite plus a substantial proportion of people in the area remain in favour of the 
completion of the Temelín plant largely for reasons of employment opportunities. Having 
failed in recent attempts to attract funding from any of the foreign foundations or from the 
state, Jihočeské matky now faces severe financial difficulties.18 
The difficulties faced by Jihočeské matky can be contrasted with the experience of 
other NGOs operating at the local level. The Olomouc branch of Duha is similarly a 
small operation which depends almost entirely on volunteers from the local student com-
munity. However, reflecting developments within the Hnutí Duha generally, the Olo-
mouc branch has become adept at holding press conferences and in dealing with the local 
administration. The local political context is also more conducive to NGO activity. The 
recently elected Social Democrat council campaigned against the previous centre-right 
government on a pro-environment agenda, and are keen to involve NGOs in the local 
policy process. The Duha campaign to reduce municipal waste has won them the support 
of the environmental department of the municipal authorities and in particular the local 
mayor. The NGO also benefits greatly from the fact that the town is heavily dominated by 
students from Palacký University, which provides a largely sympathetic background for 
their activities. Though funding remains an issue, the NGO benefits from a situation in 
which the local authority provides subsidised office space for which NGOs can apply.19 
Conclusion 
The fluctuating political efficacy of the environmental movement in the Czech Republic 
during the past decade can be attributed to a number of interlinked factors, most of which 
have been identified in the theoretical discourse on social movements in western democ-
racies [Kriesi et al. 1995]. The political opportunity structure at both the national and 
local level and the political disposition of the incumbent government has clearly had an 
impact on the ability of the environmental movement to gain political influence. The elec-
tion of a centre-right administration in 1992, and then a centre-left government in June 
1998, had a direct impact on the political influence of the environmental movement. 
Though the ideological persuasion of a particular government clearly shapes the situative 
context in which environmental NGOs operate, the balance of power between ministries 
within that government also greatly affects political access. While the current centre-left 
administration contains a number of pro-environmental ministers, much rests on the abil-
ity of the environment minister, Kužvart, to overcome opposition from within his own 
minority government and party. The recent decision on the future of the Temelín nuclear 
plant illustrated that despite a pro-environmental core of younger ministers within the 
Social Democratic government, the old guard politicians who favour industrial interests 
over the environment are well placed (industry, transport) to overturn policy initiatives 
put forward by Kužvart. 
The availability of resources for NGOs has long been recognised as a factor in the 
empowerment and mobilisation of interest associations within the political arena [Zald 
and McCarthy 1987]. In the case of funding NGOs in the Czech Republic, the resource 
issue is particularly significant in the sense that as a consequence of the communist leg-
acy and subsequent economic restructuring, NGOs cannot rely on sufficient levels of 
                                                     
18) Interview with Jaroslava Brožová, November 1998. I am also grateful to Petr Jehlička for in-
formation obtained on this NGO as part of his as yet unpublished research. 
19) Interview with Hana Konvalinková, Duha (Olomouc), 14 May, 1999. 
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public donation, as is the case elsewhere in Europe. Though the recent experience of 
Greenpeace, discussed above, suggests that in fact the Czech public are now more in-
clined and able to support NGOs, levels of disposable income remain low and most 
NGOs lack the resources to invest in fund-raising. While it is assumed that in the long 
term this situation will alter, NGOs are currently dependent on limited state funding, on 
donations from foreign philanthropic organisations, and on aid from the EU. Such sources 
of funding are unsustainable and not the basis for the long-term development of NGOs. 
Though Czech NGOs have developed considerably over the past decade in terms of their 
internal organisation and interaction with the media and the public, smaller groups still 
lack basic resources and know-how. Post-communist societies lack the developed infra-
structure of civil society that so benefits civil associations in more established democra-
cies. This infrastructure is somewhat intangible: on a basic level it includes such practical 
assistance to NGOs as access to information (on other groups, new laws, foreign organi-
sations), and to resources such as photocopiers, computers, and fax machines. Organisa-
tions such as the National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) in the UK 
provide training programmes ranging from effective public relations, fund-raising, and 
accounting practices, to legal advice.20 Though agencies and foundations exist in the 
Czech Republic offering such assistance (for example, the British Know-How Fund pro-
vides training as does the EU through the Phare Programme, and also the Soros-backed 
Open Society), the dissemination of resources and know-how is limited and often fails to 
extend to smaller organisations outside of Prague. 
The funding and resource issue has had the greatest impact on the capacity of envi-
ronmental NGOs. The political exclusion of the environmental movement during the 
Klaus period was exacerbated because of the lack of a robust and resourced civil society. 
The constraints on the development of such a western-style civil society include the leg-
acy of four decades of communist rule which essentially destroyed the historic tradition 
of civic associations in the Czech lands, plus the impact of rapid and extensive economic 
restructuring since 1990, which has led to social fragmentation and displacement and 
does not lend itself to the development of cohesive and stable associations. 
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